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The purpose of the study is to investigate the impact of EU’s Russia sanctions as 
well as Russian counter sanctions announced during the Ukrainian crisis on 
Finnish stock market. Due to dubious actions in Ukraine, the EU has imposed 
several restrictive measures against Russia starting in 2014. As a response to 
sanctions imposed by the EU, Russian counter decided to execute restrictions of its 
own. The sanctions included limitations against different individuals, 
organizations and specific sectors. 
 
The study focuses on four different sanctions announcements and examines if 
these events generate abnormal returns on the Finnish stock market. As a 
methodology, event study is applied. The daily stock returns are calculated from 
OMX Helsinki 25 stock index. 
 
The results suggest that the Finnish stock market is affected by various sanctions 
announcements. The impact of the sanctions can be both positive and negative. 
Only one announcement did not have any impact on stock returns: Russian 
counter sanctions. On the other hand, the most significant results came from 
restrictions imposed by the EU against Russian financial institutions as well as 
some specific industries such as oil sector. This study shows that Finnish and 
Russian businesses are integrated and the activities against Russia can also affect 














































This chapter begins with introducing the background of the study concentrating 
especially on the actions in the Crimea that led to the use of restrictive measures. 
The chapter continues with representing the purpose and the research problem of 
the study. Additionally, hypotheses are constructed together with showing the 
structure of the thesis. 
 
 
1.1. Background and Motivation 
 
The crisis in Ukraine has had significant attention lately. There is a lot of discussion 
about the actions in Crimea since the relations of Ukraine and Russia became even 
more complicated than in the past. The tensions between Ukraine and Russia 
began in 2013 due to violation of the territorial integrity of Ukraine and the 
annexation of Crimea by pro-Russian separatist forces (Veebel 2015). Due to these 
actions in Crimea and destabilization of Russia, the European Union has imposed 
several sanctions against the Russian Federation (European Union 2015). The 
restrictive measures used included sector-specific targeted sanctions, in other 
words smart sanctions (Vebeel 2015). 
 
The European Union is focusing on calming the crisis in Ukraine and supports its 
economic and political reforms. The EU believes that a solution to the crisis should 
be found through negotiations between the Governments of Ukraine and Russian 
Federation. In order to achieve a peaceful environment in Ukraine, EU has 
imposed several restrictions such as travel bans and asset freezes together with 
prohibition on EU companies providing financial services to Russian banks. The 
restrictions are for individuals whose actions threaten the territorial integrity of the 
Ukraine. (European Sanctions 2015.) 
 
Previous studies have investigated whether or not the usage of sanctions have the 
effect wanted. There are several divergent opinions about sanctions and their 
effectiveness. (Hovi, Huseby and Sprinz 2005; Farmer 2000; Dreger, Fidrmuc, 
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Kholodilin & Ulbricht 2015; Jing, Kaempfer and Lowenberg 2003; Driscoll, 
Halcoussis and Lowenberg 2011.) Since the events in Crimea have raised a lot of 
concerns in multiple countries, it is interesting to know if the sanctions imposed 
during the Ukrainian crisis have any influence on Finland.  
 
The relationship of Finland and Russia has always been special. Even though the 
cultures, size, population as well as the political and economic systems differ from 
each other, Russia and Finland are bound by historical conflict, trade, association 
and a long border (Dickinson 2003). This thesis investigates whether the Finnish 
stock markets are so linked to the political situations in Russia that the market 
reacts significantly on the sanction announcements.  
 
1.1.1 Crisis in Ukraine 
 
The current crisis in Crimea is the most significant crisis since Ukraine gained its 
independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. After becoming independent, 
Ukraine has been trying to build strong political institution, make economic 
reforms, and reduce corruption. Ukraine is still highly divided into eastern and 
western halves that have different languages, religions and ethnical heritage. In 
addition, Ukraine has weak governance, oligarch dominated economy and high 
dependence on Russia. (Council on Foreign Relations 2014.)  
 
Russia has strong ties with Ukraine. Ukraine was part of Russia for centuries and 
the relationship continued through the Soviet Union. In addition, Ukraine is an 
important economic partner of Russia. Its pipelines transfer 80% of the natural gas 
Russia sends to Europe. Moreover, Ukraine is a one of the main markets for 
Russian gas.  (Council on Foreign Relations 2014.) According to Smith and Harari 
(2014), the strategic value of Ukraine, especially Crimea, is essential for Russia. 
Russian Black Sea fleet is based at Sevastopol in the Crimea. Additionally, 
Ukrainian border is very close to Moscow. Therefore, Ukraine gives Russia a good 
access to the Black Sea as well as protection against other countries that might be a 
threat to Russia. (Smith & Harari 2014.) Since there is a lot of ethnic Russians living 
in Ukraine and especially in Crimea, Russia considers protections of these people 
important. (Council on Foreign Relations 2014; Smith & Harari 2014.) 
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Everything began when Ukraine tried to have closer relationship with the 
European Union. The EU’s Eastern Partnership Program attempts to build stronger 
ties with former Eastern bloc countries such as Ukraine. Russia considers that as a 
threat because it can be seen as en effort of getting closer to organizations like 
NATO, which brings military alliance closer to Moscow. (Council on Foreign 
Relations 2014; Smith & Harari 2014.) Due to high dependence on Russia especially 
when it comes to energy imports, Ukraine has stayed out from the EU enlargement 
process. However, in 2008 the EU offered Stabilization and Association agreement 
to Ukraine. (Dreger, Fidrmuc, Kholodilin & Ulbricht 2015.) In November 2013 the 
Ukrainian government refused to sign Association Agreement and Deep and 
Comprehensive Free Trade agreement with the EU. Instead, Ukraine decided to 
develop tighter cooperation with Russia. (Smith & Harari 2014; Dreger, etc. 2015.) 
 
These actions led to violent demonstrations in Spring 2014 where many protesters 
and security personnel were killed. Russia refused to give financial support to 
Ukraine and the Crimean peninsula was surrounded by the Russian Federation. 
Also the airports in the Crimea were filled with military personnel. Everything 
escalated into an armed conflict where the fighting parties were forces supported 
by Russia and Western Ukrainian government. (Smith & Harari 2014; Dreger etc. 
2015.) 
 
After unsuccessful attempts of political settlement, the Crimea was willing to join 
the Russian Federation. (Smith & Harari 2014.) Before, the Crimea was an 
autonomous republic with its own parliament and laws and Russian language. 
Now Crimea was about to build a union with Russia, which meant Russian 
legislation and integration of economic, financial and credit systems as well as 
military service.  (Council on Foreign Relations 2014.) 
 
The United States and the European Union want Ukraine to become a democracy 
with tighter economic and political connections to the EU. Therefore, there is a 
strong conflict between Russia and Western countries. Western leaders accused 
Russia of violation of Ukrainian sovereignty and threatening international order. 
As a response of the developments in the Crimea, the EU and the US have 
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executed several actions, including sanctions, against these activities. The sanctions 
started during the annexation of Crimea and as the conflict got worse, the 
sanctions got harder.  Finally, the sanctions included for example travel bans and 
asset freezing. Russia responded with the sanctions of its own containing a ban of 
food imports from the US, the EU, Canada and Australia as well as restrictions for 
certain citizens. (Council on Foreign Relations 2014; Smith & Harari 2014; Dreger 
etc. 2015.) The imposed sanctions are described in more details in the next chapter. 
 
1.1.2. EU Sanctions on Russia and Russian Counter Sanctions 
 
The European Union used multiple restrictive measures against Russia as a result 
of Ukrainian crisis. The sanctions were used in April, May, July and September in 
2014 and even extended few times in 2015 (Veebel 2015). The EU imposed asset 
freezes and travel bans for different people and organizations. In addition, the 
access of state-owned financial banks of Russia on financial markets was limited 
and EU citizens were banned from investing in financial instruments of these 
institutions. Moreover, restrictions against specific sectors were imposed. For 
example import and export of military equipment as well as dual-use goods for 
military end-use were banned. Therefore, all the products going to Russian army 
were prohibited. The sanctions included also some specific products used in 
Arctic, deep water and shale oil projects. European Union limited also technical 
assistance and brokering services. (Ministry of Finance 2014.)  
 
However, the sanctions were only able to harm specific areas such as oil, gas and 
raw materials production, but not the core elements of the Russian economy. 
Additionally, the travel bans included only top politicians but the President 
Vladimir Putin or Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev. (Veebel 2015.) 
 
As a response to imposed sanctions against Russia, it decided to execute counter 
sanctions. Russia imposed a ban on the import of meat and meat products, milk 
and dairy products, root crops, vegetables, nuts and fruits, vegetable fat-based 
food products, fish and shellfish. The sanctions were imposed against the EU, the 
USA, Canada, Australia and Norway. The ban does not include imports by private 
individuals or products for children. Later, Russia informed that the sanctions do 
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1.2. Purpose and Research Problem 
 
The purpose of the study is to investigate the impact of EU’s Russia sanctions as 
well as Russian counter sanctions announced during the Ukrainian crisis on 
Finnish stock market. The study focuses on different kind of sanctions in order to 
compare their significance and importance to the Finnish market. The impact of 
sanctions especially on the stock markets has been poorly examined in the 
previous studies. Therefore, this study brings up something new to the field of 
academic literature. 
 
This thesis is focusing on four different kinds of sanctions announcement 
concerning Ukrainian crisis. First list of sanctions focuses on asset freezes and 
travel bans of individuals whereas the second list of sanctions is related to the 
limitations of Russian financial institutions on EU capital markets as well as goods 
for military end users and oil sector. The third list of sanctions includes the 
sanctions imposed by Russia. In the fourth list of sanctions the previous 
restrictions executed by the EU are strengthened. (European Council 2015B.)  The 
purpose of this thesis is to answer the question: How do the announced sanctions 
affect Finnish stock market? 
 
 
1.3. Hypothesis Development 
 
In this study six different hypotheses are developed. The hypotheses are based on 
the study of Schneider and Troeger (2006). Schneider and Troeger (2006) examine 
the relationship between political events and the world economy. They state that 
stock market reactions to international crises were mostly negative. They 
hypothesized that financial markets react to a conflict negatively if they expect the 
conflict to be costly for the economy. On the other hand, if the investors believe 
that the event will have an increasing effect on the future wealth of the economy 
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the markets will react positively. This study focuses on four different sanctions 
announcements and the hypotheses are based on different features of them. These 
announcements are introduced in chapter 5 and they include non-economic, 
economic sanctions as well as Russian counter sanctions. Therefore, the hypotheses 
are divided to three different pairs. Hypotheses are shown below. 
 
H0.1: Non-economic sanctions affect positively to Finnish stock market. 
 
H1.1: Non-economic sanctions affect negatively to Finnish stock market. 
 
H0.2: Economic sanctions affect positively to Finnish stock market. 
 
H1.2: Economic sanctions affect negatively to Finnish stock market. 
 
H0.3: Russian counter sanctions affect positively to Finnish stock market. 
 
H1.3: Russian counter sanctions affect negatively to Finnish stock market. 
 
 
1.4. Structure of the Study 
 
This thesis is constructed as follows. First, the theoretical background and the 
theories behind the study are introduced. Theories are concentrating on explaining 
how the value of a common stock or commodity is constructed as well as 
describing market efficiency and its different forms.  
 
Secondly, this study presents previous literature on sanctions. This chapter 
introduces potential users of sanctions, different types of sanctions and their 
possible impacts. Additionally, the chapter includes history of imposing sanctions 
and presents three examples from the past focusing on describing the reasons 
behind as well as the outcome of using sanctions. In the end of the chapter the 
Western sanctions and Russian counter sanctions are briefly introduced. 
 
In the fourth chapter this thesis focuses on the relationship between Finland and 
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Russia. Due to a significant integration of these two countries it is possible that the 
sanctions imposed by the EU and Russian counter sanctions have significant 
effects on the Finnish economy. The chapter signifies potential impacts of sanctions 
on the Finnish corporations as well as their overall effects on the Finnish economy. 
In addition, the chapter goes more deep into the case of Valio and represents the 
impact of Russian counter sanctions on Valio’s operations. 
 
The fifth part of the thesis consists of introducing the data and methodology used 
in order to examine the impact of sanctions on the Finnish stock market. The study 
continues with representing the results. Empirical findings are divided into four 
different parts in order to represent the significance of each announcement 
separately. Afterwards, the conclusions are made and the references as well as 























2. STOCK VALUATION AND MARKET EFFICIENCY 
 
 
Theoretical background of this study consists of stock valuation and market 
efficiency theories. The purpose of stock valuation chapter is to show how the 
value of a stock is constructed in order to understand the factors affecting the 
prices. Moreover, market efficiency theory is introduced. Market efficiency theory 
shows that new available information is reflected in the prices of stocks and 
commodities (Bodie, Kane and Marcus 2014: 350-351). Therefore, market efficiency 
theory can explain the impact of stock markets to the sanctions announcements. 
 
 
2.1. Stock Valuation 
 
According to Brealey, Myers and Allen (2011:78), the value of a common stock can 
be described as follows: 
 
(1)  𝑃𝑉 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 = 𝑃𝑉 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑  𝑓𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒  𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠 , where 
 𝑃𝑉 = 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡  𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 
 
The payoff to investors of a stock includes two different parts: cash dividend and 
capital gains or losses. Therefore, the expected return of a stock is: 
 
(2)  𝐸 𝑟 = 𝐷𝐼𝑉1+𝑃1−𝑃0𝑃0  , where 𝐸 𝑟 = 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑  𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝐷𝐼𝑉 = 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑  𝑝𝑒𝑟  𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑃! = 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒  𝑎𝑡  𝑡ℎ𝑒  𝑒𝑛𝑑  𝑜𝑓  𝑎  𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑃! = 𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡  𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒  𝑜𝑓  𝑎  𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑃! − 𝑃! = 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒  𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛  𝑝𝑒𝑟  𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 
 
Alternatively, price of a stock can be also predicted if a forecast of dividend, price 
and the expected return offered by other equally risky stocks are given. In that case 
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the predicted today’s price is: 
 
(3)  𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 = 𝑃0 = 𝐷𝐼𝑉1+𝑃11+𝑟 , where 𝑟 = 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡  𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 
 
According to Brealey, Myers and Allen (2011:78-79), discount rate can be described 
as opportunity cost of capital, market capitalization rate or cost of equity capital. 
They define the expected return on other securities with the same amount of risk. 
All securities in a same risk class are priced to offer the same expected return. 
 
If we try to forecast price of a common stock to infinity, we can forget the terminal 
price, because it approaches to zero. Therefore, today’s price is a stream of cash 
dividends. (Brealey, Myers and Allen 2011:79.) 
 
(4)  𝑃0 = 𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑡(1+𝑟)𝑡∞𝑡=1 , where ∞ = 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐷𝐼𝑉! = 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑  𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑚 
 
Sometimes there is a constant growth rate for a company’s dividends, which 
means that the dividends are expected to grow at a constant rate. In that case, in 
order to find a present value of a share to infinity, we need to take into 
consideration the discount rate as well as the growth rate. (Brealey, Myers and 
Allen 2011:81.) 
 
(5) 𝑃! = !"#!!!! , where 𝑔 = 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ  𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 
 
 
2.2. Market Efficiency 
 
According to Fama (1970), allocation of ownership is a major role of capital 
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markets. It means that the goal is to have markets where prices provide signals for 
resource allocation. Therefore, it should be possible for investors to choose 
between commodities based on security prices that “fully reflect” all available 
information. A market in which prices reflect perfectly all available information is 
called efficient market.  
 
According to Fama (1970) and Brealey, Myers and Allen (2011:314-315), efficient 
market theory suggests that prices of stocks and commodities should follow a 
random walk. It means that price changes should be independent and the 
probability of winning and losing should be the same. In addition, Bodie, Kane 
and Marcus (2014: 9) state that there should be no “free lunches” available for the 
investors. In other words, there should be few, if any, under-priced securities 
available that would represent bargains. That is because any information that 
could be used in order to find out stock’s performance should be already reflected 
in the price of a stock. In case there is any stock that might be under-priced and 
lead to profit opportunity, investors start buying the stock and the price returns to 
its ordinary level, which is the level that takes its risk into consideration. (Bodie, 
Kane and Marcus 2014: 350-351.) 
 
Efficient market hypothesis suggests that all available information is reflected in 
the prices of stocks and commodities (Bodie, Kane and Marcus 2014: 350-351). 
However, if all available information is already reflected in the prices of stocks, the 
only affecting information must be new (Bodie, Kane and Marcus 2014: 350). 
Therefore, new announcement about sanctions should be reflected in the stock 
prices in case the information is unpredictable. Consequently, the stock prices are 
expected to change when the information about the Russia sanctions is announced.  
 
There are three different forms of efficient markets: weak, semistrong and strong. 
They differ from each other by the degree of information reflected in security 
prices. Weak market efficiency means, that prices include the information from the 
past. It reflects the history of past prices, trading volume and short interest. (Fama 
1970; Bodie, Kane and Marcus 2014: 352; Brealey, Myers and Allen 2011: 317-318.) 
 
The semistrong-form includes all the publicly available information. Therefore, the 
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prices reflect the information from the past as well as fundamental data on firm’s 
product line, quality of management, balance sheet information, earning forecasts, 
accounting practices and mergers. All of this information is possible to get from 
public resources.  (Fama 1970; Bodie, Kane and Marcus 2014: 352; Brealey, Myers 
and Allen 2011: 317-318.) 
 
Strong market efficiency determines that the prices reflect all the information 
relevant to the firm, such as company insiders’ information in addition to 
information from the past as well as publicly available information (Fama 1970; 
Bodie, Kane and Marcus 2014: 352; Brealey, Myers and Allen 2011: 317-318). Strong 
form of market efficiency is quite extreme. Some could argue that officers of 
corporations are able to get inside information before it gets public and therefore 
can gain profits. Actually, all the trading by companies’ officers, directors and 
owners are monitored by Securities an Exchange Commission. The SEC records all 
the trades made by these insiders and therefore, any use of this information, their 
relatives or any associates on trading are considered as violation of the law. (Bodie, 



















3. PREVIOUS LITERATURE ON SANCTIONS 
 
 
Sanctions are important tools in foreign policy (Hufbauer, Schott and Elliot 1990: 1) 
According to Farmer (2000), sanctions can be described as activities that a country 
(the sender) does in order to restrict the import and export of goods, services and 
capital between itself and another country (the target). The purpose is to affect the 
foreign policies and national security of the target. By using sanctions, the sender 
tries to raise the costs to the target countries or change the behaviour of their 
citizens.  On the other hand, imposing sanctions can also lead to costs for the 
sender and its businesses as well as consumers.  
 
Sanctions have become more attractive due to revolutions in foreign policy. 
World’s political climate has changed together with the growing volume of trade. 
Nuclear production and international terrorism have increased and raised a lot of 
concerns about the future. Foreign policy is focusing more and more on human 
rights, drug blocking as well as environmental issues. These factors are hard to 
control with diplomatic or military forces only, which is why sanctions are 
nowadays commonly used. (Farmer 2000.) However, there is a lot of discussion 
about the usefulness of sanctions and whether they cause more costs than benefits 
for the sender. 
 
 
3.1. Users of Sanctions  
 
Sanctions are part of international diplomacy. Countries using sanctions are 
commonly large nations that have an active foreign policy. Due to the fact that they 
are big, they can influence events more effectively globally. By applying these 
measures, the user can send a signal to the target country saying that their actions 
are not acceptable. In addition, they give the allies a sign that their words become 
actions. Lastly, the user gives their domestic audiences a feeling of safety. 
(Hufbauer, Schott and Elliot 1990: 11.) 
 
There are also international organizations that can be the key player of applying 
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sanctions. United Nations Security Council has the main responsibility for 
maintaining the international peace and security. It determines the existence of 
threat to the peace and act of aggression. Its mission is to find a settlement between 
arguing parties and recommend methods in order to achieve a peaceful 
environment. By imposing sanctions the Security Council can achieve its main 
goals. (United Nations Security Council 2015.)  
 
United Nations has four main purposes. The first one is to maintain peace and 
security. Secondly, it develops friendly relations among nations together. It also 
cooperates in solving international problems and promotes respect in human 
rights. Lastly, United Nations aims to be the centre for harmonizing the actions of 
nations. All members of United Nations agree to accept the decisions of the 
Security Council. (United Nations Security Council 2015.)  
 
According to UN Security Council Sanctions Committees (2015), sanctions are 
measures to maintain or restore international peace and security. Sanctions can be 
economic or other sanctions not involving the use of armed force. Compulsory 
sanctions are used to put pressure on a state or entity and enforce Security 
Council’s decisions. They are enforcement tools when peace is threatened and 
diplomatic attempts have failed. (UN Security Council Sanctions Committees 
2015.)  
 
The EU Members are part of a Common Foreign Security Policy for the European 
Union. It aims to strengthen the EU’s civilian and military capabilities in 
preventing conflicts as well as crisis management. (European Union External 
Action 2015a.) According to European Union External Action (2015b), sanctions 
can be restrictive measures against third countries, individuals or entities. They are 
used as a tool of EU’s foreign policy together with the principles of Common 
Foreign and Security Policy. Certain EU measures are adopted from UN Security 
Council but it can also apply autonomous measures. (European Union External 
Action 2015b.) 
 
According to European Union External Action (2015b), sanctions should be used as 
a part of integrated process involving political dialogue, complementary efforts 
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and other instruments. The measures should target the policies and actions that 
have encouraged the EU to impose sanctions. The purpose is to identify the ones 
responsible for the harmful behaviour. Targeted measures used should minimize 
the consequences for those not responsible for the unwanted policies or actions. 
They should especially protect the local civilian populations together with the 
legitimate activities in or with the country concerned. Sanctions cannot have 
consequences for those not responsible (European Union External Action 2015b.) 
 
The EU uses its restrictive measures in order to cause a change in a policy or 
activity of the target country, part of a country, government, entities or 
individuals. By using sanctions as preventive tools, EU should be able to respond 
quickly to political challenges and developments. Sanctions are preventive 
instruments that do not cause a punishment. It helps the EU to respond to different 
political challenges and developments. The EU autonomous sanctions or EU 
additions to UN sanctions are regularly reviewed in order to verify that the 
restrictive measures are used as needed. They need to be in line with the 
determined objectives stated commonly. (European Union External Action 2015b.) 
 
 
3.2. Types of Sanctions 
 
There is a wide range of sanctions that can be executed. All of the previous studies 
have their own classifications for all different sanctions. Dregers, Fidrmuc, 
Kholodilin and Ulbricht (2015) have different stages of sanctions that are ranked 
according to their power. UN Security Council Sanctions Committees (2015) 
divides sanctions to economic, trade and more targeted sanction. Jing, Kaempfer 
and Lowenberg (2003) argue that choosing between different policy instruments is 
directly related to the outcome of sanctions. On they other hand, Jing, Kaempfer 
and Lowenberg (2003) add that effectiveness of the sanctions depends on the 
nature of the target. Therefore, the same sanctions cannot have the same effect in 
every country.  
 
According to UN Security Council Sanctions Committees (2015), multiple different 
kinds of sanctions can be found: financial and trade sanctions or more targeted 
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sanctions such as travel bans, financial and diplomatic restrictions or arms 
embargoes. Targeted sanctions can include for example freezing of assets or 
blocking the financial transactions. (UN Security Council Sanctions Committees 
2015.) Trade sanctions and financial sanctions are often referred as economic 
sanctions (Hufbauer, Elliot, Cyrus & Winston 1997).  
 
According to Dreger, Fidrmuc, Kholodilin and Ulbricht (2015), several stages of 
sanctions can be found. The weakest form of sanctions includes diplomatic 
sanctions, such as withdrawal of ambassadors or suspension of international 
negotiations. The next level contains tools for targeting individual citizens and 
companies. These tools ban be travel bans, asset freezes, discontinuing 
development aid or inhibition of getting credit from international sources. The 
strongest form of sanctions includes restrictions against specific industrial sector 
such as trade limits or embargoes. 
 
Jing, Kaempfer and Lowenberg (2003) state that choosing between different 
sanctions depends on the conditions of the target. Therefore, it is essential to 
choose carefully, which kind of sanction is appropriate to use. For example 
military force is not commonly used against economically healthy and politically 
stable targets. In addition, financial sanctions are more attractive when the target 
country receives financial support from a third-country. On the other hand, if the 
target country is economically healthy, financial sanctions are not considered as an 
effective instrument.  
 
3.2.1. Political Sanctions  
 
Political sanctions are often referred as diplomatic sanctions. According to Maller 
(2010), they can be seen as low-cost tools of isolating and legitimizing regimes.  
The possible costs of these sanctions contain loss of information and intelligence on 
the target and also decrease in communication capacity. Political sanctions are 
imposed when policymakers are willing to encourage diplomatic engagement and 
create better diplomatic ties. For example, the United States executed political 
sanctions during the World War II and cut diplomatic ties with different states 
including Japan and Germany. More recently, diplomatic tools have been used 
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against events connected to terrorism and proliferation. (Maller 2010.) 
 
3.2.2. Financial Sanctions 
 
Financial sanctions can be used in order to damage the target country’s commercial 
and official finance. Financial sanctions can include requiring higher interest rates 
by the creditors. More powerful outcome of using financial sanctions can lead to 
freezing the target country’s foreign assets like bank accounts.  These sanctions can 
stop the money flow together with preventing the trade. United States has used 
financial sanctions against Iranian assets in 1979.  Additionally, The UK froze 
Argentine assets in 1982. In the 1990, United States froze Kuwait’s assets in order 
to avoid Saddam Hussein stealing from them. (Hufbauer, Schott and Elliot 1990: 
37-38.) 
 
3.2.3. Trade Sanctions 
 
Trade sanctions can cause costs to the target country including decreasing export 
market and restrictions in critical imports. They can also involve lower prices for 
embargoes exports together with paying higher prices for imports. Export bans 
have been earlier used for oil (Arab oil embargo of 1973-1974) as well as grain. 
Import controls have been used less often due to the fact that usually the target 
countries can find alternative markets that they can take advantage of. In addition, 
some countries can have a limited legal authority to execute import limits. 
(Hufbauer, Schott and Elliot 1990: 36.) 
 
 
3.3. Impacts of Sanctions  
 
Previous studies concerning the different effects of sanctions on the economy have 
concentrated on South-Africa, Iraq and Iran (Manby 1992; Schott 2012; Lopez & 
Cortright 2004; Von Sponeck 2000). They are mostly focusing on the political and 
economic outcomes of different types of sanctions. Moreover, the previous studies 
have concentrated on the welfare consequences of sanctions.  It seems that 
sanctions bring up mostly negative effects. Most of the studies are concentrating on 
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the damaging part of sanctions and not the positive side of them.  
 
Van Bergeijk (1995) measures the impact of economic sanctions in the 1990s. He 
finds that only 35% of the sanctions used were successful during the time period 
from 1951–1989. This means that only 35% of the sanctions helped to change the 
target’s behaviour to the wanted direction. Therefore it is interesting to know why 
the sanctions are so widely used.  
 
According to Jing, Kaempfer and Lowenberg (2003), the choice of policy 
instrument such as trade sanctions or financial sanctions, is directly related to the 
outcome of the sanctions. In order to use the sanctions, the sender needs to 
investigate whether the benefits of imposing the sanctions are bigger than the costs 
(Farmer 2000). Morgan and Schwebach (1997) state that sanctions can be useful in 
restrictive conditions and may even improve the impact of other policies. 
However, there is a risk that the sender will pay big amounts for little return. In 
some cases the outcome of using sanctions might be the same as without imposing 
them.  
 
According to Dreger, Fidrmuc, Kholodilin & Ulbricht (2015), the evidence on the 
efficiency of sanctions varies. For example, trade sanctions can harm both the 
sender and the target country. Additionally, it seems that countries with tight 
economic relationships suffer the most of the sanctions.  Farmer (2000) points out, 
that sometimes the result of using sanctions is not what is expected. For example, 
putting a limit to foreign aid or trade may only affect to particular countries and 
does not have any effect on the total spending. In addition, most of the laws that 
authorize sanctions can allow the President to abandon the enforcement. This 
happens especially when the sanctions affect the national security.  
 
According to Farmer (2000), three different situations can influence the 
functionality of sanctions. First of all, whether other countries participate in the 
trade restrictions. Secondly, whether the target country is a developing or 
industrialized economy and lastly, whether the target is able to impose sanctions 
by itself.  
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It is essential that the other countries participate in the intention of reducing the 
flow of goods and capital to the target country. Otherwise the usage of sanctions 
might be ineffective. Moreover, the costs of sanctions for the sender are potentially 
smaller for the developing countries. The sanctions usually work better when they 
are used against an individual developing country, not whole regions due to the 
fact that they sell relatively few goods. This means that the consumers of the 
sender country can find substitutes from somewhere else. On the other hand, the 
wealthiest economies sell goods and services that are unique and highly 
differentiated. Therefore it is difficult for the consumer to find similar products 
from other regions. In some cases, if the target country responses with its own 
sanctions, the costs of the sender may increase significantly. If the target country 
does not impose sanctions of its own, the sender can simply adjust its trade by 
seeking alternative markets. (Farmer 2000.)  
 
In the case of sanctions against Russia, it is hard to predict whether the markets 
will react positively or negatively because the impact of sanctions is not well 
examined in previous literature. In addition, sanctions can have numerous effects 
that might include both positive and negative outcomes (Schneider & Troeger 
2006). 
 
3.3.1. Costs of sanctions 
 
According to Hufbauer, Schott and Elliot (1990: 36), there are three different 
opportunities for the sender of sanctions trying to affect the costs of its target. The 
sender can reduce exports, put limits on imports and restrict financial services. 
Additionally, the sanctions can combine all of these different types.  
 
According to Farmer (2000), sanctions can cause losses in economic efficiency. 
They can harm especially the incomes of production for exports that requires 
capital and skilled labour. In addition, the savings and consumer satisfaction can 
be in danger. Sanctions may cause indirect damage to the trade due to the 
decreased reliability by affecting to reliable work force, open legal system, financial 
infrastructure as well as stable economic policies. Farmer (2000) also states that 
sanctions can reduce future economic growth by damaging the activities of high-
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income and high-growth domestic products.  
 
According to Farmer (2000), sanctions can cause damage to monopoly rents. 
Losing such rents harms the most the industries where future profits depend on 
certain high-technology products that include “learning by doing” in order to 
achieve dominant positions. This may include for example oil producers. 
Additionally, adjusting country’s trade to new patterns can lead to additional 
costs. These costs may contain temporary unemployment and reduced output. 
Other difficulties are inflexible wages and government regulation. 
 
Hufbauer, Elliot, Cyrus and Winston (1997) investigate the impact of US economic 
sanctions for its economy. They find that the US exports suffered significantly due 
to the sanctions it imposed. Reduced exports mean that domestic firms may not be 
able to supply replacement parts or related technologies. The reduction of exports 
can continue as long as the same intensity of sanctions takes place. Actually, the 
negative impact of sanctions might even grow over time. Moreover, lower exports 
can cause a drop in employment due to the fact that fewer workers are employed 
in the export sector. This can also lead to lower wages. Therefore, not only the 
firms suffer but the workers too. (Hufbauer et al.1997.) 
 
3.3.2. Do Sanctions Work? 
 
According to Hovi, Huseby and Sprinz (2005), when examining the effectiveness of 
sanctions, two different opportunities need to be distinguished. Firstly, whether 
the sanctions have actually been imposed and secondly, whether there has been 
only a threat of using sanctions.  Normally, the change in target’s behaviour can be 
found in threat stage. On the other hand, there are cases that the threat fails and 
sanctions are executed. According to Hovi et al. (2005), imposing sanctions does 
not have as good effectiveness as in the threat stage.  
 
If both sender and the target have behaved rationally, Hovi et al. (2005) state that 
there are three possibilities why the sanctions might fail. First, a threat of sanctions 
might not work because the target country may not consider the sanctions credible. 
Second, the target might think that it is more regrettable to accept the sender’s 
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demands than receive the consequences of sanctions. Thirdly, the sanctions might 
fail because the target thinks that the sanctions do not lead to yielding. Moreover, 
the sanctions might be unsuccessful due to the fact that the target might consider 
that the change in its actions might not prevent the sanctions from happening. 
(Hovi et al. 2005.) 
 
Hovi et al (20045) assume that if the threat of sanctions fails, the sanctions will not 
be imposed because the threat is empty or sanctions will be imposed but the target 
will not yield. This might be because the consequences are not potential. They also 
state that if the target does not yield to the threat of sanctions, it will not yield after 
imposing the sanctions. Imposed sanctions can only work if the target does not 
have a perfect knowledge of the actions. This means that the target must 
miscalculate the sender’s willingness to impose sanctions, underestimate the 
consequences or wrongly believe that the sanctions will be imposed even if the 
target yields.  
 
Jing, Kaempfer and Lowenberg (2003) state that sanctions success is positively 
correlated with a close the relationship between the sender and the target. On the 
other hand, economic health and political stability are negatively correlated with 
the success of the sanctions used. Moreover, there is no evidence of a third-country 
existence reduces the efficiency of sanctions or that the cost of sanctions to either 
the target or the sender affects the outcome of imposing sanctions. Verdier and 
Woo (2011) add that sanctions are more effective when they are used against 
democracies than non-democracies.  
 
Driscoll, Halcoussis and Lowenberg (2011) argue that the linkages between nations 
are an important element determining the successfulness of using sanctions. They 
state that countries with similar cultures are less likely to impose sanctions against 
each other than countries with weak cultural ties. On the other hand, it seems that 
if the countries are culturally similar, the sanctions are most likely to be efficient.  
 
But can the present EU-Russia sanctions actually work? According to Veebel 
(2015), the answer depends on whether the sanctions put pressure on Russia’s 
economy, such as in gross domestic product rates, foreign direct investments, and 
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exchange rates or in central bank reserves.  
 
According to Veebel (2015), the negative effects of sanctions in the GDP rates of 
Russian economy were seen in the second quarter of 2015 when it declined 4.6% 
(Eurozone -0.4%). However, the GDP of Ukraine declined by 17.2%. Moreover, the 
national currency of Russia suffered and lost one-third of its value during one year. 
On the contrary, Ukraine’s currency lost approximately 60% of its value. Also the 
inflation increased significantly during the years from 2014 to 2015. However, 
foreign direct investments did not suffer remarkably.   
 
 
3.4. History of Sanctions 
 
Sanctions have been used multiple times in history. According to Hufbauer, Schott 
and Elliot (1990: 4), economic sanctions have been used long before World War I, 
starting in ancient Greece. The politicians have realized that sanctions can be used 
as weapons of statecraft. They are economic penalties that are alternatives to the 
use of military force. (Manby 1992.) However, the most efficiently investigated 
usage of sanctions starts from World War I. (Hufbauer, Schott and Elliot 1990: 1.) 
 
3.4.1. The South African case 
 
According to Manby (1992), the case of South Africa is unique. Different institutes 
were using multiple combinations of measures: international organizations, 
governments as well as nongovernmental organizations. Moreover, the 
instruments were not used for typical reasons like maintaining peace and security. 
They were used in order to protect international standards of morality and 
especially against protests of business interests and conservative governments. 
More specifically, the penalties were imposed against peoples’ actions such as 
apartheid and discrimination. 
 
In 1946, the Indian government executed a trade embargo and broke all the 
relations to protest racial discrimination against the Indian residents in South 
Africa. The Sharpeville massacre of 1960, the state of emergency and the call of the 
 30 
African National Congress for sanctions against South Africa brought the first 
actions including international restrictions. In 1962 the United Nations General 
Assembly announced to its members to stop the trade and transports that are 
linked with South Africa. Afterwards, an oil embargo took place. (Manby 1992.) 
 
Also the Security Council called the states to stop all the shipment of arms to South 
Africa together with banning shipment of equipment and materials for arms 
manufacture. In the end of 1963, 46 states announced tat they had stopped all the 
relations with South Africa and 21 more were about to do so. During the 1970s, the 
number of consumer boycotts of South African products as well as investor 
boycotts of companies doing business with South Africa grew. South Africa started 
to suffer in the financial markets and it was difficult for it to get loans. Further 
measures of United Nations were calling for a voluntary ban on new investments, 
loan guarantees, new nuclear contracts and sales of computer equipment. In 1985, 
also European Community imposed sanctions against South Africa including 
embargo of arms and oil. Afterwards, the imports of iron and steel from South 
Africa were banned.  In addition, individual states, like the US and Japan, decided 
to execute sanctions. (Manby 1992.) 
 
Later on, nongovernmental parties imposed a campaign of disinvestment. 
Therefore, multiple countries decided to withdraw their business in South Africa.  
The uncertain political and economic climate in made South Africa look like 
unattractive investment locations. Therefore, foreign investments decreased from 
60% in 1970 to 34% in 1985. The loans became short-term debt and liquidity crisis 
begun and led to closing the stock exchange and foreign exchange markets. 
(Manby 1992.) 
 
Even though the sanctions used against South Africa were not as effective as 
hoped that does not mean that they failed. The aim of the sanctions was to create a 
new kind of South Africa with democratic and non-racial system that respects the 
justice and security of its citizens. The restrictions used have not guaranteed that 
the black people in South Africa are not disadvantaged, but they have unbanned 
harmful organizations, released political prisoners and eliminated the major 
apartheid legislation. (Manby 1992.) According to Manby (1992), without the use of 
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sanctions, these changes in South Africa would have come much later with much 
more harm. 
 
3.4.2. The Iran Case  
 
The United States has imposed sanctions against Iran for a long time. Everything 
started in 1984, when the USA used sanctions due to Iran’s bombing of the Marine 
Corps barracks in Beirut. Afterwards the USA has restricted trading with Iran 
focusing especially on the oil industry. These factors led to reduction the export 
earnings as well the Iran’s capacity to support terrorism. Later the sanctions have 
been imposed against nuclear program and development of nuclear weapons of 
Iran. (Schott 2012.)  
 
The Iran and Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) in 1996 imposed sanctions against Iran’s 
oil and gas sector and extended them in both 2001 and 2006. Due to these 
sanctions, the growth of Iranian oil production suffered. Later on, ILSA grew into 
the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions Accountability and Divestment Act (CISADA) 
and imposed new sanctions against bank and financial institutions that had 
activities with Iran. In addition, the punishments for violating sanctions tightened. 
Even though the sanctions against Iran have been restricted multiple times, they 
have not caused any changes in Iranian policy. On the other hand, they have made 
it harder for Iran to pursue terrorism and produce nuclear weapons. (Schott 2012.) 
 
Lately, in 2011 the US imposed sanctions for non-U.S. financial institutions that 
had any transactions with the Central Bank of Iran or other Iranian banks. In 
addition, they restricted Iran’s oil customers and limited their businesses with 
Iran’s oil sector. They demanded that these firms must reduce their activities with 
Iran. Us threatened the violators by blocking the US financial markets and trading 
from them. In 2012, the EU imposed sanctions and prohibited all new contracts for 
purchasing, importing, or transporting Iranian crude oil, petroleum products and 
petrochemical products. These led to decrease in Iran’s revenues and ruined 
relationships with its customers. Different countries have reduced their purchases 
of Iranian oil and are concerned about increasing oil prices and a reduced 
economic growth. (Schott 2012.)  
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3.4.3. The Iraq Case 
 
The United Nations imposed sanctions against Saddam Hussein’s weapons of 
mass destruction (WMD) programs in 1990. The sanctions policy continued as long 
as 2003. There are different opinions about whether the sanctions were effective or 
a failure. However, several positive aspects of the sanctions determination can be 
found. They reduced the capabilities of Iraq military, made Iraq to accept 
inspections and monitoring and multiple political issues such as the border 
disagreement with Kuwait. In addition, the revenue directed to Saddam reduced. 
This prevented Iraq from rebuilding defences after the Persian Gulf War and 
banned the import of essential technologies and materials for producing weapons. 
(Lopez & Cortright 2004.) 
 
The story of UN sanctions against Iraq is the longest and the most comprehensive 
process in the history. The sanctions expelled Iraq from the world trade and cut off 
its oil exports together with harming its economy and society. By destroying Iraq’s 
oil wealth and imports, sanctions prevented Iraq from rearmament. For the first six 
years of sanctions usage, Iraq sold no oil except a small amount to Jordan.  In 
addition, foreign trade was destroyed.  (Lopez & Cortright 2004.) 
 
Even though the sanctions were effective and had the consequences wanted they 
also led to smuggling and explosion of black markets. Statistics show that illegal 
revenues of Iraq in 1997-2002 amounted to over 10 billion dollars. (Lopez & 
Cortright 2004.) 
 
In 2001, the Bush administration imposed new restrictive measures called “smart” 
sanctions. The purpose of this was to block weapons and military supplies without 
blocking civilian trade. The goal was to rehabilitate Iraq’s economy without 
accepting rearmament or development of military actions. The “smart” sanctions 
led to Iraq’s acceptance of renewed inspections and Security Council approval of 
stronger monitoring. In 2002, these new sanctions had achieved the core elements 
of an effective long-term containment system.  (Lopez & Cortright 2004.) 
 
According to von Sponeck (2000), sanctions against Iraq have failed in multiple 
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ways and have had alarming effects on the Iraq’s economy. Von Sponeck (2000) 
states that the sanctions have not changed Iraq’s leadership or weakened the ruling 
elite. On the other hand, sanctions have helped to create well-controlled state and 
prevented Iraq’s internal opposition to emerge together with weakening nuclear, 
ballistic and chemical weapons production.  
 
Von Sponeck (2000) investigates the impact of Iraq’s sanctions after ten years. He 
states that most of the civilian industrial enterprises are operating at a significantly 
reduced level. In addition, the estimated level of unemployment rate has increased 
from 60 to 75 per cent. On the other hand, the oil-for-food programme starting in 
1996 had several positive impacts. First of all, the malnutrition rates stabilised and 
the deterioration of water supply and sanitation reduced. In addition, the 
distribution of humanitarian supplies to end-users increased since the interest in 
nutrition, child mortality and mental health increased. (Von Sponeck 2000.) 
 
 
3.5. Western Sanctions Against Russia and Russian Counter Sanctions  
 
Western governments implemented multiple different sanctions against Russia 
during the Ukrainian crisis. Everything started from the annexation of the Crimea. 
As a diplomatic measure Western governments excluded Russia from the G8 
meeting together with suspending cooperation agreements and visa regulations. In 
addition, Western countries have executed measures against Russian and 
Ukrainian individuals and legal communities. The strongest form of sanctions that 
included restrictions against specific industries has been used against banking, 
energy and defence sectors. For example, the USA have banned commercial 
relations between US citizens or firms and sanctioned Russian companies. 
Moreover, The USA has restricted the export of technology goods that are related 
to military actions. (Dreger, Fidrmuc, Kholodilin & Ulbricht 2015.) 
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4. BUSINESS INTEGRATION OF FINLAND AND RUSSIA 
 
 
Finland and Russia have always had a special relationship. Despite the fact that 
these two countries have widely different cultures, size and population as well as 
dissimilar political situation and economic systems, these countries are located side 
by side in northern Europe. They share the same history including conflicts, 
trading and a long border. (Dickinson 2003.) 
 
Finland became independent from Russia in 1917 and has had two wars after that 
with its neighbour. Finland and Russia have had a tight trading and business 
relationship, which has been essential for the Finnish economy. When it comes to 
marketing Finland’s own products and abilities, Finnish people have been better 
than any other country in European Union in understanding Russian business. 
(Dickinson 2003.) 
 
Also Etzold and Haukkala (2013) state that Finland’s relationship with Russia is 
very important even though they have had many ups and downs in their history 
together. They argue that Finland might have the most essential relations with 
Russia than any of the European Union members. Before the financial crisis of 
2008-2009, Russia was the largest trading partner to Finland. Even after the crisis 
the trading turnover was eleven billion euros. In addition, Finnish companies have 
invested over six billion euros in the Russian market.  Additionally, Finland and 
Russia share 1300 kilometres of land border. Moreover, Finland has active political 
relations with Russia. (Atzold & Haukkala 2013.) 
 
According to Eklund and Karhunen (2009), Finnish companies in Russia are mostly 
located in St. Petersburg, Leningrad region, Karelia and Moscow. It seems that 
there are a lot of Finnish companies from all different industries in Russia. Even 
though the economies of Russia and Finland have had a colourful history together, 
the Finnish companies have maintained their interest in doing business with 
Russian companies.  On the other hand, Finnish companies have invested in 





Huge potential of Russian markets as well as wide range of raw materials have 
attracted Finnish companies to expand their activities to Russian markets. 
However, corruption, heavy bureaucracy as well as unstable legislation have 
limited the interest of Finnish companies to do business in Russia. (Simola 2009.) 
 
 
4.1. Impact of Russia Sanctions on Finnish Economy  
 
Ministry of Finance (2014) has investigated the impact of the Russia sanctions on 
the Finnish economy. They state that in 2013, Finland’s food exports to Russia were 
over 430 million euros. One of the major producers was Valio, accounted for 350 
million euros. Therefore, the impact of the sanctions might be damaging to 
Finland. According to Ministry of Finance (2014), it is possible that prices and 
profitability of producers, especially in the dairy sector, falls due to Russian 
counter sanctions. It is alarming because milk production is one of the most 
important productions sectors in Finland.  
 
Due to sanctions imposed by the EU together with weak economic development of 
Russia, financial situation in Russia has tightened. According to Ministry of 
Finance (2014), these factors may have an impact on the sales of Finnish technology 
industry. Actually, Finland’s exports of goods had already fallen by 14% during 
the first months of the year 2014. Moreover, the uncertainty the crisis has caused 
significantly reduced the direct investments in Russia. Ministry of Finance (2014) 
does not think that the change in consumption by Russians in Finland would have 
a significant effect on the Finnish economy.  
 
According to Ministry of Finance (2014), the indirect effects are more significant 
than direct effects mentioned before. The indirect costs for Finland might appear 
due to weakening rouble, which affects by fuel inflation and slowing growth of 
consumption. This happens because people move capital out of the country due to 
uncertainty. However, the major risks are a decrease of Russia’s import volume, 
weakening of economic activity, reduction of purchasing power due to currency 
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devaluations and reduced exports of Russian oil. All of these factors affects to 
Finnish economy. (Ministry of Finance 2014.) 
 
Even though it is still unknown how the sanctions affected the Finnish economy, 
the statistics of foreign trade with Russia show that the overall interaction between 
Finland and Russia has reduced. According to Suomalais-Venäläinen 
Kauppakamari (2015), Russia was the third biggest export partner and the biggest 
import country of Finland in 2014. However, the exports decreased 14 per cent 
from 2013 to 2014 whereas the imports decreased 18 % from 2013 to 2014.  
Additionally, in the first quarter of 2015, the exports to Russia decreased 25 per 
cent comparing to 2014 (Suomen Tulli 2015).  
 
 
4.2. Impact of Russia Sanctions on Finnish Companies 
 
Finland Chamber of Commerce (2015) investigated the impact of Russia sanctions 
during the Ukrainian crisis on Finnish companies. The data were collected from 
1700 companies all over Finland containing firms of different sizes and from 
different industries. Most of the companies included were small (74%, 1-49 
workers).  
 
The companies were asked how the sanctions against Russia affect to their 
business. 43% of the companies think that they have an indirect negative impact on 
their businesses and 28% of the respondents say that there is a direct impact on 
their businesses. 30% of the companies state that no significant effect of Russia 
sanctions or economic crisis can be found on their businesses. Only 1% thinks that 
the crisis might have a positive impact on their activities. (Finland Chamber of 
Commerce 2015.) 
 
According to the study of Finland Chamber of Commerce (2015), several negative 
impacts of Russia sanctions and economic collapse can be found on the actions of 
Finnish companies. These unfortunate events had led to difficulties in selling 
products and services to the Finnish clients that have customers in Russia. In 
addition, exports to Russia have become more challenging together with 
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weakening cooperation with Russian companies. Also the solvency of Russian 
consumers has become worse and has lead to decreased purchasing power. In 
addition, the ongoing projects have slowed down due to difficulties in selling new 
projects to Russia. In fact, some companies have decided to cut all of their 
investments. The weakening of rouble and increased interest rates have made it 
difficult for the Russian companies to operate and that affects to the collaboration 
of Finnish and Russian companies.  
 
Moreover, Finland Chamber of Commerce (2015) investigated how the Finnish 
companies are planning to react to the situation. Only 1% answered that their 
companies are going to withdraw from the Russian markets whereas 3% said that 
they give up their plans of expanding to Russia. The majority of the respondents 
(71%) replied that they take no reaction to the situation. Those who reacted to the 
situation in Russia were planning to allocate their marketing to domestic markets 
or focus on the Russian industries that are not subjects of restrictions. Some 
companies have tried to find consumers from other countries and reduced their 
overall costs and operations.  
 
4.2.1. Case of Valio 
 
One of the Finnish enterprises that have suffered the due to Russia sanctions is a 
company from dairy industry, Valio. The export of milk products to Russia was 
forbidden due to sanctions imposed by Russian counter (Helsingin Sanomat 2014).  
Therefore, Valio was not able to export anything to Russian markets. According to 
Yle (2015), 20 per cent (400 million euros) of Valio’s turnover comes from Russia, 
which is why the imposing sanctions against the dairy industry can be highly 
damaging to Valio.  
 
According to Valio (2015), Russia was the most important partner until August 
2014. However, the Russian counter sanctions have forced Valio to look for new 
opportunities. Therefore, currently the most important markets are in Sweden, 
USA, China and Central Europe.  In addition, the sanctions forced Valio to start 
employee co-operation negotiations (Kauppalehti 2014.) 
 
 38 
5. DATA & METHODOLOGY 
 
 
This study is focusing on four different announcements including different kinds 
of sanctions. All of the packages of sanctions were announced in 2014 and the 
purpose is to examine whether the announcements generated abnormal returns in 
Finnish stock market. The announcements and expected results are listed below.  
 
The first sanctions package includes non-economic sanctions. The EU introduced 
its first set of restrictive measures against 21 Russian and Ukrainian officials in 
17th of March in 2014. The EU determined travel bans and asset freezes for persons 
and entities associated with threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and 
independence of Ukraine. (European Council 2015A.) According to Dreger, 
Fidrmuc, Kholodilin and Ulbricht (2015), these kinds of sanctions are considered as 
the second strongest form of sanctions. This thesis expects the first list of non-
economic sanctions to have a positive impact on the stock markets because they are 
used in order to increase the overall wealth of the economy.  Therefore, H0.1 is 
applied. 
 
H0.1: Non-economic sanctions affect positively to Finnish stock market. 
 
From 29th to 31th of July in 2014 the EU adopted additional restrictive measures 
against Russia that included economic sanctions. These decisions limit the access of 
Russian state-owned financial institutions to EU capital markets. In addition, they 
impose an embargo on trade in arms and establish an export ban for dual use 
goods for military end users. Moreover, these restrictions reduced Russia’s access 
to sensitive technologies especially in oil sector. (European Council 2015A.) These 
sanctions are the strongest and can have powerful effects on the economy (Dreger, 
Fidrmuc, Kholodilin & Ulbricht 2015). This thesis expects that the second list of 
sanctions will have a negative impact on the markets because they restrict the 
operations of financial services together with restriction in oil sector. In this case, 
H1.2 is applied. 
 
H1.2: Economic sanctions affect negatively to Finnish stock market. 
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Russia responded with sanctions of its own in 7.8.2014. Russia imposed an import 
ban against EU, USA, Canada, Australia and Norway. The sanctions included for 
example an import of meat, meat products, milk and milk products, root crops, 
vegetables, fruits and nuts, fish and shellfish. (Valtiovarainministeriö 2014.) The 
third list of sanctions is expected to have a negative effect on the stocks market due 
to restrictive measures of Russian counter that affect Finnish companies that have 
tight connections to Russia. Therefore, H1.3 is applied. 
 
H1.3: Russian counter sanctions affect negatively to Finnish stock market. 
 
In 12.9.2014, the EU tightened its economic and non-economic sanctions against 
Russia. Restrictions on Russia’s access to EU capital markets were strengthened 
together with a prohibition of the supply of certain services necessary for deep 
water oil exploration and production, arctic oil exploration or production and 
shale oil projects in Russia. Additionally, the ban on exporting dual use goods and 
technology for military use in Russia was extended. Moreover, 24 persons were 
added to the list of those subject to travel ban and asset freeze. (European Council 
2015A.) 4) The fourth list of sanctions is also expected to affect negatively due to 
the fact that the sanctions against capital markets and oil industry were tightened. 
This package of sanctions included both economic and non-economic sanction. 
Therefore, two hypotheses are applied. 
 
H1.1: Non-economic sanctions affect negatively to Finnish stock market. 
 
H1.2: Economic sanctions affect negatively to Finnish stock market. 
 
 
5.1. Data  
 
This thesis uses OMX Helsinki 25 (OMXH25) stock index as a database for 
calculating the daily stock returns over the estimation period. OMX Nordic 120 
(NOMXN120) stock index is used as market return.  Figure 1. represents general 
movements of OMX Helsinki 25 around the four sanctions announcement 
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investigated in this thesis. The time period is from 7.3.2014 to 22.9.2014. 
 
 
                  





In this thesis event study methodology is used in order to analyse the effect of the 
sanction announcement on Finnish stock markets. Event studies are often used in 
order to have evidence against market efficiency (Benninga 2008).  According to 
Benninga (2008), the purpose of an event study is to examine whether some 
particular event affects stock market performance. The basic idea of this study is to 
find the abnormal returns caused by the sanction announcement. The abnormal 
returns can be estimated by calculating the difference between the actual return 
and expected return of a stock (Benninga 2008:371). An example of an impact of a 
news announcement is shown in Figure 1.  
 41 
 
        
            
                Figure 2. Impact of news announcement. 
 
 
      
When implementing an event study, different time frames can be constructed: the 
estimation window, the event window and the postevent window. The estimation 
window defines the normal behaviour of stocks. (Benninga 2008: 372-373.)  
According to Benninga (2008: 372-373), the normal behaviour of stocks can be 
described as follows: 
 
(6) 𝑅!" = 𝛼! + 𝛽!𝑅!", where 





    Figure 3. Different time frames of an event study. 
 
 
The estimation window examines the normal behaviour of stock’s return and the 
sample is collected before the event day, when the event has not had any impact 
on the stocks yet. The event window is placed around the actual announcement 
day whereas the postevent window monitors the performance of s stock after the 
event. It measures the long-term effect. (Benninga 2008: 372-373.)  According to 
Benninga (2008: 374), the abnormal return can be constructed from the equation 
below.  
 
(7) 𝐴𝑅!" = 𝑟!" −   (𝛼! + 𝛽!𝑟!"), where 
 𝐴𝑅!" = 𝐴𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙  𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑟!" = 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙  𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘  𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛  𝑖𝑛  𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡  𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑤  𝑑𝑎𝑦  𝑡 𝛼! + 𝛽!𝑟!" = 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛  𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑   
 
Cumulative abnormal return measures the total sum of abnormal returns during 
the event window (Benninga 2008). 
 
(8) 𝐶𝐴𝑅! = 𝐴𝑅!!!!!!!! , where 
 𝐶𝐴𝑅! = 𝐶𝑢𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒  𝑎𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙  𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝐴𝑅!" = 𝐴𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙  𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛  𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚  𝑡ℎ𝑒  𝑏𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔  𝑜𝑓  𝑡ℎ𝑒  𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡  𝑇!  𝑡𝑜  𝑑𝑎𝑦  𝑡  
 
The measure of the event’s economic impact in this study is constructed using 
daily prices of OMX Helsinki 25 (OMXH25) stock index. First, the normal stock 
returns are estimated based on the estimation window before the event. The 
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planned length of estimation window is five days. The event window consists of 
day before and after the event. It is used in order to calculate the abnormal returns 
the event causes. Additionally, the longer-term performance is estimated by using 
the postevent window. All of the different time frames include only trading days. 
 
I used adjusted closing prices and calculated daily returns using natural logarithm.  
I applied the equations 6, 7 and 8 in order to find out the abnormal returns (AR) of 
the stock index OMX Helsinki 25 as well as the cumulative abnormal returns 
(CAR). Afterwards I examined the significance of the results by t-test using 5 per 


























6. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
 
This chapter represents the empirical findings of the study. All of the results of 
different sanctions announcements are shown in their own chapters. The goal is to 
answer the question: How do the sanctions impact the Finnish stock market? 
 
 
6.1. The First Announcement 
 
The first announcement includes non-economic restrictions against Russian and 
Ukrainian officials. The sanctions contained travel bans and asset freezes. Figure 2. 
shows different time frames of the first announcement. The event day is 17.3.2014 
but the event window includes trading days before and after the event. Therefore, 
the event window consists of days from 14.3.2014 to 18.3.2014.  The estimation 
window includes five trading days before the actual event whereas the postevent 




     Figure 4. Time frames of the first announcement. 
 
 
Table 1. represents the expected returns, abnormal returns, cumulative abnormal 
returns as well as the results of t-test for individual abnormal returns. The values 
of t-test show, that only one day has statistically significant results (t-value 4,72). 
This means that the first list of sanctions has significant positive effect on the 
Finnish stock markets in the first day of the event. Therefore, H0.1 is accepted.  
 
H0.1: Non-economic sanctions affect positively to Finnish stock market. 
 














14.3.14 -1,54 % 1,56 % 1,56 % 4,72 yes 
17.3.14 1,29 % 0,25 % 1,80 % 0,75 no 
18.3.14 0,54 % 0,32 % 2,12 % 0,96 no 
19.3.14 -0,81 % 0,05 % 2,17 % 0,15 no 
20.3.14 -0,95 % -0,17 % 2,00 % -0,51 no 
21.3.14 -0,83 % 0,36 % 2,36 % 1,10 no 
24.3.14 -1,45 % 0,26 % 2,62 % 0,79 no 
25.3.14 0,70 % 0,63 % 3,25 % 1,92 no 
 
 
These results show that the Finnish stock markets expect the first list of sanctions 
to have a positive impact on the economy. This could mean that these non-
economic sanctions including travel bans and asset freezes against Russian and 
Ukrainian officials are considered as valuable tools for maintaining wealth and 
prosperity of the economy and especially the welfare of Ukraine. The results are in 
line with the expected results of the study. 
 
 
6.2. The Second Announcement 
 
The second list of sanctions limited the access of Russian state-owned financial 
institutions to EU capital markets. Additionally, they harmed the trade of arms 
and dual use goods as well as sensitive technologies. According to Hufbauer, 
Elliot, Cyrus and Winston (1997), these sanctions can be referred as economic 
sanctions. The second list of sanctions was revealed within three days from 
29.7.2014 to 31.7.2014 but the event window includes one day before and after the 
announcement. Therefore, the event window consists of days from 28.7.2014 to 
1.8.2014. The estimation window includes days from 21.7.2014 to 25.7.2014 whereas 




       Figure 5. Time frames of the second announcement. 
 
Table 2. represents the effect of the second announcement of sanctions on OMX 
Helsinki 25. It shows the expected returns, abnormal returns, cumulative abnormal 
returns and the values of t-test for individual abnormal returns. In the case of the 
second announcement, there are five statistically significant values in 5% 
significance level. This means, that the second list of sanctions has highly negative 
impact on the Finnish stock markets within the event window as well as after the 
event. The postevent shows that the announcement has had also a long-term 
impact on the Finnish stock markets.  Therefore, H1.2 is accepted. 
 
H1.2: Economic sanctions affect negatively to Finnish stock market. 
 
 














28.7.14 0,38 % -0,95 % -0,95 % -1,95 yes 
29.7.14 0,32 % -0,30 % -1,25 % -0,62 no 
30.7.14 0,37 % -0,86 % -2,11 % -1,76 no 
31.7.14 0,45 % -1,53 % -3,64 % -3,13 yes 
1.8.14 0,45 % -1,50 % -5,14 % -3,07 yes 
4.8.14 0,33 % 0,06 % -5,07 % 0,13 no 
5.8.14 0,27 % -0,71 % -5,79 % -1,46 no 
6.8.14 0,48 % -1,88 % -7,66 % -3,85 yes 
7.8.14 0,40 % -0,79 % -8,46 % -1,63 no 




The results are not surprising since the sanctions are expected to have multiple 
negative impacts on the economy. The restrictive measures against Russia’s 
financial institutions as well as ban of trading arms and dual use goods are 
expected to cause expenses for several countries. This might be due to the fact that 
the exports of Russia’s business partners might decrease. Therefore, the countries 
having deep relationship with Russia are expected to suffer from the sanctions. 
The restrictions can be especially harmful for the oil sector since the sanctions 
prevented Russia’s access to sensitive technologies. In addition, the sanctions can 
harm the financial markets of the economy due to decisions to limit the access of 
Russia state-owned financial institutions to EU capital markets. The results are in 
line with the expected results that predicted the second list of sanctions to have 
negative impact on the stock markets. 
 
 
6.3. The Third Announcement 
 
The third list of sanctions was imposed by Russia. It included restrictions against 
the trade of important products such as meat and milk. The event day of the third 
list of sanctions was 7.8.2014. Therefore, the event window consists of days from 
6.8.2014 to 8.8.2014. The estimation window includes days from 30.7.2014 to 
5.8.2014 and the postevent window days from 11.8.2014 to 15.8.2014. The time 
frames are shown in Figure 4. 
 
 
        Figure 6. Time frames of the third announcement.  
 
 
Table 3. represents the impact of the third list of sanctions on Finnish stock market. 
According to t-test, the announcement has no significant impact on the stock 
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returns of OMX Helsinki 25. Therefore, neither H0.3 nor H1.3 can be applied in the 
case of third announcement of sanctions.  
 
 













6.8.14 -1,08 % -0,32 % -0,32 % -0,53 no 
7.8.14 -0,65 % 0,26 % -0,07 % 0,42 no 
8.8.14 -0,79 % -0,90 % -0,97 % -1,47 no 
11.8.14 0,74 % 0,97 % 0,00 % 1,58 no 
12.8.14 -0,48 % 0,53 % 0,53 % 0,86 no 
13.8.14 -0,10 % 0,33 % 0,86 % 0,54 no 
14.8.14 -0,36 % 0,48 % 1,34 % 0,79 no 
15.8.14 -0,40 % 0,15 % 1,49 % 0,24 no 
 
 
The results are surprising since the Russia imposed an import ban of several 
important products. The restrictions were against the EU, the US, Canada and 
Norway and included for example meat and milk products as well as fruits and 
vegetables. This study expected the third list of sanctions to have a negative impact 
on the stock markets since the sanctions concerned the Finnish companies such as 
Valio that are exporting food to Russia. 
 
 
6.4. The Fourth Announcement 
 
The EU strengthened its economic and non-economic sanctions against Russia in 
12th September 2014 concerning supply restrictions harming especially the oil 
sector as well as ban of trading that is connected to dual use goods. Additionally, 
the travel bans and asset freezes were extended. The event window consists the 
trading days before and after the event including days from 4.9.2014 to 10.9.2014. 
Additionally, the estimation window includes five days before the event window 
starting from 4.9.2014. The postevent window contains five days after the event 
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window from 16.9.2014 to 22.9.2014. 
 
 
       Figure 7. Time frames of the fourth announcement. 
 
 
Table 4. shows the results of the fourth announcement. It represents the expected 
returns, abnormal returns, cumulative abnormal returns and the results of t-test 
around the sanctions announcement. Only two significant values can be found and 
they are both included in the postevent window. It seems that after the 
announcement OMX Helsinki 25 has had more positive returns than expected. The 
t-values of the returns in 17.9.2014 and 19.9.2014 are statistically significant in 5 per 
cent significance level. Therefore, H0.1 and H0.2 can be applied.  
 
H0.1: Non-economic sanctions affect positively to Finnish stock market. 
 
H0.2: Economic sanctions affect positively to Finnish stock market. 
 
 













11.9.14 -0,49 % 0,12 % 0,12 % 0,23 no 
12.9.14 -0,32 % 0,11 % 0,23 % 0,21 no 
15.9.14 -0,37 % 0,30 % 0,53 % 0,55 no 
16.9.14 -0,48 % -0,15 % 0,38 % -0,28 no 
17.9.14 -0,24 % 1,06 % 1,44 % 1,96 yes 
18.9.14 -0,18 % 0,41 % 1,85 % 0,75 no 
19.9.14 -0,33 % 1,26 % 3,11 % 2,34 yes 
22.9.14 -0,43 % 0,31 % 3,42 % 0,57 no 
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The results show that strengthening of the EU sanctions has had no significant 
effect on the Finnish stock markets during the event but afterwards it has caused 
significant positive returns. The restrictions against Russia’s financial institutions, 
prohibition of supply of certain services as well as travel bans and asset freeze 
were tightened and the Finnish stock markets reacted positively to the restrictions. 
This can be due to the fact that the sanctions were expected to have a positive effect 
on the economy increasing welfare and reducing the conflict in Ukraine. This 
thesis predicted that the fourth announcement of sanctions would have a negative 
impact on the Finnish stock markets. Therefore, the actual results are not in line 





























The purpose of the study was to examine the impact of EU’s Russia sanctions and 
Russian counter sanctions on the Finnish stock market. The hypotheses were based 
on a study of Schneider and Troeger (2006). They argue that stock markets react 
positively to the events that will increase the wealth of the economy and negatively 
to the actions that are believed to have a damaging impact on the economy. 
Additionally, the study relies on market efficiency theory finding that security 
prices should reflect all available information that is new (Vega 2006; Bodie, Kane 
& Marcus 2014: 350). Therefore, the prices of stocks were expected to change when 
new information about sanctions is revealed.  
 
The fact that Finland and Russia are highly bonded to each other (Etzold and 
Haukkala 2013), the Finnish stock markets were expected to have some kind of 
reaction to the sanctions announcements. Moreover, Ministry of Finance (2014) 
predicted the sanctions to have multiple negative impacts on the Finnish economy. 
It states that multiple Finnish companies have been forced to change their 
operations because of sanctions that were able to harm their businesses. 
 
The impact of the sanctions announcements was examined by using event study as 
a methodology. The purpose was to answer the question: “How do the sanctions 
announced impact the Finnish stock market?”. The results were found by 
examining the abnormal returns generated by the event. The findings were 
relatively surprising and some of them against the outcomes expected in the study.  
 
The first package of sanctions included non-economic restrictive measures against 
Russian and Ukrainian official consisting of asset freezes as well as travel bans. 
Empirical findings show that the first announcement had highly positive impact 
on the Finnish stock market.  Therefore, the first list of sanctions including travel 
bans and asset freezes were expected to increase the overall wealth of the 
economy.  
 
The second sanctions announcement was the most significant one. It consisted of 
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limitations against Russian state-owned financial institutions as well as restrictions 
against trading dual use goods for military end users. Moreover, the sanctions 
reduced Russia’s access to sensitive technologies. According to Dreger, Fidrmuc, 
Kholodilin and Ulbricht (2015), these sanctions are the most powerful ones. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that Finnish stock market reacted highly negatively 
on the announcement of sanctions. In fact, five highly negative t-values were found 
during the announcement. This means that the economic sanctions have a negative 
effect on the Finnish stock market not only during the announcement but also long 
after the new information was revealed. Therefore, it is easy to say that the 
sanctions against Russian financial institutions as well as restrictions against some 
specific technologies in Russia were expected to have a tightening impact on the 
Finnish economy. This shows that the business integration of Russia and Finland is 
strong. 
 
The most surprising results came out when Russia imposed counter sanctions on 
import of goods against different countries. The sanctions were expected to have 
remarkable effects on the Finnish economy since they included a ban of importing 
several important goods such as milk products. One of the Finnish companies that 
were expected to suffer the most is called Valio since 20 per cent of its turnover 
came from Russia. Additionally, trading of multiple other goods such as 
vegetables, fruits, fish and meat products were forbidden. Even though these 
restrictions seem hard they did not have any impact on the Finnish stock market. 
No statistically significant t-values of individual abnormal returns can be found 
during the event.  
 
The fourth announcement of sanctions strengthened already imposed sanctions by 
the EU including both non-economic and economic sanctions. For example, 
restrictions on Russia’s access to capital markets were even tightened together with 
limitations against oil sector. Additionally, the list of persons subject to travel ban 
and asset freeze was extended. The results show that the restrictions of previous 
sanctions had a positive impact on the Finnish stock market especially after the 
event. The results are somewhat surprising since the second announcement that 
included the same kind of sanctions caused highly negative effect on the stock 
prices. The outcome shows, that the markets expected the fourth list of sanctions to 
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increase the wealth of the economy. 
 
As a conclusion, this thesis showed that the Finnish stock market is affected by 
various sanctions announcements. The impact can be both positive and negative.  
Only one package of sanctions did not have any effect: the sanctions imposed by 
Russian counter. On the contrary, the most significant impact on the Finnish stock 
market was caused by economic restrictions against Russian financial institutions 
as well as limitations against specific industries such as oil sector. Therefore, it is 
obvious that Finnish and Russian businesses are integrated and the activities that 






REFERENCES   
 
 
Benninga, S. (2008). Financial Modeling. 3rd Ed. London: The MIT Press. 1106 p. ISBN 
978-0-262-02628-4. 
 
Bodie, Z., A. Kane & A. Marcus (2014). Investments. 10th Ed. New York etc.: 
McGraw-Hill Inc. 1014p. ISBN 978-0-07-786167-4. 
 
Brealey R., S. Myers & F. Allen (2011). Principles of Corporate Finance. 10th Ed. New 
York etc.: McGraw-Hill Inc. 875p. ISBN 978-0-07-353073-4. 
 
Council on Foreign Relations (2014). Ukraine in Crisis [online]. Available from 




Dickinson, P. (2003). Finland and Russia: A Special Relationship. European Business 
Review, 15:1, 59-60.  
 
Dreger, C., J. Fidrmuc, K. Kholodilin & D. Ulbricht 2015. The Ruble Between the 
Hammer and the Anvil: Oil Prices and Economic Sanctions. BOFIT Discussion 
Papers, 2015:25, 1-28. 
 
Driscoll, D, D. Halcoussis & A. Lowenberg (2011). Economic Sanctions and 
Culture. Defence and Peace Economics, 22:4, 423-448.  
 
Eklund, T. & P. Karhunen (2009). Helsinki School of Economics: 
Suomalaisomisteiset yritykset Venäjällä [online]. CEMAT Papers 2/2009, 1-7 




Etzold, T. & H. Haukkala (2011). Is There a Nordic Russia Policy? Swedish, Finnish 
 55 
and Danish Relations with Russia in the Context of the European Union. 
Journal of Contemporary European Studies, 19:2, 249-260. 
 
European Council (2015a). EU Restrictive Measures To Response To The Crisis in 








European Sanctions – Law and Practice (2015). Russia. Available from World Wide 
Web: <URL: http://europeansanctions.com/eu-sanctions-in-force/russia/>. 
 
European Union External Action (2015a). Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP) of the European Union. Available from World Wide Web: 
<URL:http://eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/index_en.htm>. 
 
European Union External Action (2015b). Sanctions Policy [online]. Available from 
World Wide Web: 
<URL:http://eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/sanctions/index_en.htm>. 
 
European Union Newsroom (2015). EU Sanctions Against Russia over Ukraine Crisis 




Fama, E. F. (1970). Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical 
Work. Journal Of Finance, 25:2, 383-417. 
 




Finland Chamber of Commerce (2015). Kauppakamarin kysely: Miten Venäjän 
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APPENDIX 1. Prices of OMX Helsinki 25 from 7.3.2014 to 25.3.2014. 
 
Date High price Low price Closing price 
7.3.14 2927,88 2885,18 2889,01 
10.3.14 2891,88 2853,70 2864,86 
11.3.14 2885,89 2858,64 2866,69 
12.3.14 2857,36 2807,85 2816,48 
13.3.14 2832,15 2775,97 2776,49 
14.3.14 2780,64 2741,12 2777,00 
17.3.14 2820,72 2770,96 2819,90 
18.3.14 2847,80 2798,83 2844,21 
19.3.14 2851,56 2814,01 2822,64 
20.3.14 2826,05 2783,14 2791,26 
21.3.14 2803,91 2776,56 2778,29 
24.3.14 2788,67 2740,05 2745,48 
25.3.14 2790,95 2751,29 2782,28 
 
 
APPENDIX 2. Prices of OMX Nordic 120 from 7.3.2014 to 25.3.2014. 
 
Date High price Low price Closing price 
7.3.14 827,64 818,43 818,99 
10.3.14 821,97 813,10 815,66 
11.3.14 820,66 814,88 817,77 
12.3.14 817,40 803,22 806,31 
13.3.14 811,28 801,48 801,62 
14.3.14 801,04 788,55 793,39 
17.3.14 805,99 792,91 805,68 
18.3.14 813,94 801,26 812,63 
19.3.14 814,09 808,69 809,64 
20.3.14 807,66 801,09 805,64 
21.3.14 807,38 802,47 802,54 
24.3.14 805,52 794,25 794,95 





APPENDIX 3. Prices of OMX Helsinki 25 from 21.8.2014 to 8.8.2014. 
 
Date High price Low price Closing price 
21.7.14 2958,86 2938,89 2955,63 
22.7.14 2981,91 2950,83 2960,07 
23.7.14 2984,76 2962,91 2981,54 
24.7.14 3013,83 2984,67 2995,98 
25.7.14 3008,33 2982,78 2989,96 
28.7.14 3000,53 2963,03 2973,00 
29.7.14 2990,47 2964,59 2973,65 
30.7.14 2975,36 2949,98 2959,16 
31.7.14 2960,14 2924,37 2927,48 
1.8.14 2931,48 2887,22 2897,02 
4.8.14 2923,87 2903,48 2908,49 
5.8.14 2920,25 2895,55 2895,56 
6.8.14 2879,97 2845,51 2855,32 
7.8.14 2861,93 2842,28 2844,02 
8.8.14 2810,48 2786,92 2796,41 
 
 
APPENDIX 4. Prices of OMX Nordic 120 from 21.8.2014 to 8.8.2014. 
 
Date High price Low price Closing price 
21.7.14 827,86 821,77 824,55 
22.7.14 836,55 824,53 836,19 
23.7.14 839,57 835,08 838,12 
24.7.14 842,50 837,98 840,20 
25.7.14 843,11 838,61 841,14 
28.7.14 842,51 835,07 836,64 
29.7.14 839,73 835,92 837,61 
30.7.14 838,19 833,25 834,49 
31.7.14 836,43 823,46 823,85 
1.8.14 824,23 812,46 813,46 
4.8.14 819,13 813,36 813,64 
5.8.14 821,02 815,48 819,56 
6.8.14 819,01 803,26 806,78 
7.8.14 808,35 801,29 801,30 
8.8.14 800,33 785,99 793,59 
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APPENDIX 5. Prices of OMX Helsinki 25 from 30.7.2014 to 15.8.2014. 
 
Date High price Low price Closing price 
30.7.14 2975,36 2949,98 2959,16 
31.7.14 2960,14 2924,37 2927,48 
1.8.14 2931,48 2887,22 2897,02 
4.8.14 2923,87 2903,48 2908,49 
5.8.14 2920,25 2895,55 2895,56 
6.8.14 2879,97 2845,51 2855,32 
7.8.14 2861,93 2842,28 2844,02 
8.8.14 2810,48 2786,92 2796,41 
11.8.14 2849,34 2819,86 2844,68 
12.8.14 2856,89 2837,75 2846,11 
13.8.14 2866,77 2843,34 2852,73 
14.8.14 2865,00 2838,14 2856,28 
15.8.14 2875,21 2845,62 2849,09 
 
 
APPENDIX 6. Prices of OMX Nordic 120 from 30.7.2014 to 15.8.2014. 
 
Date High price Low price Closing price 
30.7.14 838,19 833,25 834,49 
31.7.14 836,43 823,46 823,85 
1.8.14 824,23 812,46 813,46 
4.8.14 819,13 813,36 813,64 
5.8.14 821,02 815,48 819,56 
6.8.14 819,01 803,26 806,78 
7.8.14 808,35 801,29 801,30 
8.8.14 800,33 785,99 793,59 
11.8.14 811,82 793,60 811,62 
12.8.14 812,46 808,14 809,08 
13.8.14 813,54 808,71 813,01 
14.8.14 813,18 809,03 812,50 






APPENDIX 7. Prices of OMX Helsinki 25 from 4.9.2014 to 22.9.2014. 
 
Date High price Low price Closing price 
4.9.14 3010,53 2965,73 3010,34 
5.9.14 3012,17 2992,83 3002,51 
8.9.14 3008,18 2992,19 3005,81 
9.9.14 3014,67 2977,10 2980,88 
10.9.14 2965,51 2947,50 2956,77 
11.9.14 2973,53 2941,31 2945,94 
12.9.14 2952,74 2938,66 2939,65 
15.9.14 2942,90 2926,15 2937,49 
16.9.14 2938,01 2908,24 2919,06 
17.9.14 2951,69 2940,00 2943,04 
18.9.14 2956,22 2944,65 2949,76 
19.9.14 2979,53 2960,32 2977,54 
22.9.14 2989,29 2962,40 2973,84 
 
 
APPENDIX 8. Prices of OMX Nordic 120 from 4.9.2014 to 22.9.2014. 
 
Date High price Low price Closing price 
4.9.14 846,81 837,68 846,47 
5.9.14 846,94 838,27 839,06 
8.9.14 842,47 837,59 842,15 
9.9.14 842,85 837,54 837,55 
10.9.14 838,86 831,82 838,63 
11.9.14 841,68 833,37 834,95 
12.9.14 839,69 834,21 838,15 
15.9.14 839,74 832,61 839,39 
16.9.14 839,83 832,83 836,22 
17.9.14 843,82 837,31 842,96 
18.9.14 852,58 844,51 852,35 
19.9.14 858,67 855,06 855,52 
22.9.14 856,99 851,38 854,19 
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